small incursions may seem evil, while we possess the sense to consider someone like Hitler to be evil; those of the former are often not conflated with the latter, and yet there are those who don't believe this to be the case, perhaps vying for his innocence or aligning with his aims. are they evil by virtue of their belief, even when they have not committed any material act which runs counter to normative values? a case of the intolerant within a tolerant society.
there seems to be a schism between rational belief in evil and a belief which uses rationality as a mouthpiece to emotion; the sort of guttural anathema one feels when they think of a child-murderer; and yet, despite the definition of 'evil' being in the same vein, one might not hold the same feelings towards someone like Hitler, though they may recognize that Hitler is thought of as evil
the concept of evil serves purely as a practical, contractual agreement. currently philosophy has not evolved to be able to articulate formally how moral assignment functions