Well as I understand it, empiricism is based on what you can "detect," for lack of a better word, with your 5 senses. So in that sense, of course math wouldn't be considered empirical. But as KCN seems to have been emphasizing, it is critical in our use of analyzing things empirically. And if you feel that way about Math, what about Logic? That must not be an empirical science either, am I wrong? No disrespect to you, thanks.
My sense of the provenance of this dispute is that KCN wanted to justify his incorrect use of the term "proof." It simply isn't controversial that "proof" is a concept reserved for mathematics and logic (I failed to include the latter before), and isn't part of empirical science. Empirical scientists don't "prove" things, they gather evidence and build
defeasible theories via hypothesis construction and testing. This fact has led to the realization that empirical scientific theories are pervasively
underdetermined: "Underdetermination is a thesis explaining that for any scientifically based theory there will always be at least one rival theory that is also supported by the evidence given, and that that theory can also be logically maintained in the face of any new evidence." "This is a result of our inability to completely understand or gain access to the whole set of empirical evidence for any one particular situation or system, and therefore our acceptance that new evidence could be made available at any time. This thesis maintains that since there is no method for selecting between our two (or more) valid solutions, the validity of our conclusion is always in question."
https://www.rit.edu/cla/philosophy/quine/underdetermination.html
KCN's response to this being noted was to try to implausibly elide mathematics and science, without appreciation for the obvious fact that application of mathematics in science is distinct from mathematics as such.
Yes, logic is an abstract, or non-empirical, discipline, like mathematics. This seems undeniable to me, but if you want details, see this paper:
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d124/3542b263f9a807871adf4803e0c096dd21ad.pdf.
Here are some passages that may help clear up some of the confusion surrounding these topics. Consider the following from philosopher Elijah Chudnoff:
"Abstract reality encompasses the necessary, normative, infinite, and abstract as in non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. Mathematics, metaphysics, and morality are about it. Concrete reality encompasses the contingent, non-normative, finite, and concrete as in spatio—and/or—temporal and/or causally efficacious. Physics, psychology, and history are about it. These seem like fairly natural groupings. It might be that there are some tough borderline cases such as time itself or the universe as a whole . . . ."
Consider also the following from mathematician and philosopher Neil Tennant:
"Philosophy is a conceptual discipline. Its method is introspective and reflective. It is based on our intuitions and on our grasp of the meanings of our words. Yet it aspires now, after two and a half millennia of refinement, refutation and re-thinking, not to be provincial to any particular language. Nor is it confined to any particular historical period, cultural milieu, socio-political system or religious affiliation. Philosophy strives to be of universal appeal, to any rational intellect, human or otherwise. In that regard, it is a lot like Mathematics. Philosophy tries not to depend on empirical considerations, even though one of its main contemporary aims is to come to mutually enlightening terms with natural science."
"Mathematics and natural science both aim at the truth. Mathematics aims at necessary truths about abstract structures and objects. Natural science, by contrast, aims at law-like truths about the various natural kinds of physical objects and events forming the causal order in space and time."
As I understood it, he/she was describing the overlapping of the factual content you are talking about with a proper mathematical formula, and vice versa. Hence unifying both sides
Again, the fact that empirical scientific facts are often expressible in mathematical terms does not make them part of mathematics as such. In their work, engineers rely on facts that are the province of physics in everything they do; this doesn't entail the absurd idea that there's no principled distinction to be drawn between engineering and physics -- they're separate disciplines for a reason. KCN clearly just didn't want to be wrong about the concept of proof, and so kicked up this nonsense effort to run mathematics and empirical science together, such as to make it somehow illegitimate to say that proof is exclusive to mathematics (and logic) and doesn't feature in empirical science.
To further illustrate the point, take KCN's example of the speed of light. KCN apparently believes that the speed of light is a mathematical fact, or exists in some nebulous borderland between mathematics and physics. Anyone who knows about the history of the discovery of the speed of light knows that it was discovered via empirical work, and is simply expressed in quantitative terms (if you're unfamiliar with the history, see this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speed_of_light#History). The processes by which it was discovered, those of empirical science, are clearly highly distinct from the processes that lead to advancement in mathematics (consider my earlier example of the proof of Fermat's last theorem). Mathematical proofs don't involve observational data, for example. To say that the speed of light somehow falls under the umbrella of mathematics because it is quantitatively expressed is about as silly as saying that any fact expressed in a language should be classified as a linguistic fact.