DarkRange55
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- Oct 15, 2023
- 2,366
Positioned at the maritime crossroads of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, Greenland lies between two emerging Arctic shipping corridors that could substantially shorten global transit times. Geographically, Greenland is part of the North American landmass. Today, the United States maintains one military installation there, Pituffik Space Base, formerly known as Thule Air Base, located in northwestern Greenland. That footprint represents a significant drawdown from the 17 U.S. bases that were active at the end of World War II.
The new U.S. National Defense Strategy, released January 23, designates Greenland as key terrain, placing it alongside strategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal and the Gulf of America. Conventional ballistic missiles follow a predictable flight profile. They travel into outer space before reentering the atmosphere, allowing tracking systems and ground based interceptors to calculate their trajectory. Hypersonic cruise missiles differ in that they are maneuverable and operate at lower altitudes, often beneath radar coverage, which makes them far more difficult to detect and intercept.
Pituffik provides a forward detection advantage, capable of identifying launches and aerial objects earlier than other installations across large sections of Arctic space. This early warning coverage is critical to the missile defense architecture supporting what is envisioned as North America's Golden Dome. Despite this advantage, broader regional surveillance gaps persist. Research from the Danish Institute for International Studies indicates that radar coverage across Greenland remains insufficient to reliably detect Russian aircraft. In parallel, NATO currently lacks adequate anti submarine capacity in the GIUK Gap, the maritime corridor separating Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Taken together, these deficiencies highlight enduring vulnerabilities across both the air and maritime domains of the High North.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia significantly reduced its conventional ground forces but retained its strategic submarine fleet, which it continues to prioritize as a core element of deterrence. Although Moscow may trail in certain fifth and sixth generation technologies, it remains closely competitive in undersea lethality and strategic strike capability. China has also moved to establish a presence in the region through its Polar Silk Road program, linking Arctic development to the broader Belt and Road Initiative, a roughly $1 trillion foreign policy platform designed to expand Beijing's global economic reach and military access.
Since the end of the Cold War, Arctic geopolitics has been shaped by the concept of Arctic exceptionalism, an idea advanced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that framed the region as a zone reserved primarily for scientific cooperation and insulated from great power rivalry. That framework has begun to erode. A whole of government Arctic strategy issued by the White House eight months after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine outlined intensifying competition. The 2022 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region states that China doubled its investments in the region over the previous decade, focusing on critical mineral extraction and dual use research with intelligence or military applications. Within Greenland, the Danish government moved to block several proposed projects involving Chinese state owned enterprises.
According to Risk Intelligence, a Denmark based consultancy, the period following the Ukraine invasion saw China begin constructing dock infrastructure at five major ports along Russia's Arctic coastline, Murmansk, Sabetta, Arkhangelsk, Tiksi, and Uzden, while also developing railway links tied to Chinese logistics networks in the region. Even so, reputational and political constraints complicate Beijing's ability to fully capitalize on these developments. Many European states are expected to deepen defense cooperation with the United States over time, in part because of the high cost burden associated with independent military expansion.
The 2025 National Security Strategy calls for expanded naval and Coast Guard operations and aggressive targeting of drug cartels.
"We want to ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough to prevent and discourage mass migration to the United States…"
"We want a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations."
Some governments have also used engagement with China as negotiating leverage in their dealings with Washington. Although policymakers recognized limited long term alignment potential with Beijing, engagement was at times used as a form of strategic anesthesia to ease tensions generated by earlier transatlantic political frictions.
The emerging global order reflects a shift in power distribution. The United States remains the predominant power, but no longer operates as a singular hyperpower, with multiple layers of polarity and overlapping blocs now shaping geopolitical alignment. Short of kinetic conflict, Xi Jinping has pursued strategic leverage through the global trade system, advancing industrial policy and a military civil fusion strategy to expand China's influence and operational reach.
The new U.S. National Defense Strategy, released January 23, designates Greenland as key terrain, placing it alongside strategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal and the Gulf of America. Conventional ballistic missiles follow a predictable flight profile. They travel into outer space before reentering the atmosphere, allowing tracking systems and ground based interceptors to calculate their trajectory. Hypersonic cruise missiles differ in that they are maneuverable and operate at lower altitudes, often beneath radar coverage, which makes them far more difficult to detect and intercept.
Pituffik provides a forward detection advantage, capable of identifying launches and aerial objects earlier than other installations across large sections of Arctic space. This early warning coverage is critical to the missile defense architecture supporting what is envisioned as North America's Golden Dome. Despite this advantage, broader regional surveillance gaps persist. Research from the Danish Institute for International Studies indicates that radar coverage across Greenland remains insufficient to reliably detect Russian aircraft. In parallel, NATO currently lacks adequate anti submarine capacity in the GIUK Gap, the maritime corridor separating Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Taken together, these deficiencies highlight enduring vulnerabilities across both the air and maritime domains of the High North.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia significantly reduced its conventional ground forces but retained its strategic submarine fleet, which it continues to prioritize as a core element of deterrence. Although Moscow may trail in certain fifth and sixth generation technologies, it remains closely competitive in undersea lethality and strategic strike capability. China has also moved to establish a presence in the region through its Polar Silk Road program, linking Arctic development to the broader Belt and Road Initiative, a roughly $1 trillion foreign policy platform designed to expand Beijing's global economic reach and military access.
Since the end of the Cold War, Arctic geopolitics has been shaped by the concept of Arctic exceptionalism, an idea advanced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that framed the region as a zone reserved primarily for scientific cooperation and insulated from great power rivalry. That framework has begun to erode. A whole of government Arctic strategy issued by the White House eight months after Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine outlined intensifying competition. The 2022 U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region states that China doubled its investments in the region over the previous decade, focusing on critical mineral extraction and dual use research with intelligence or military applications. Within Greenland, the Danish government moved to block several proposed projects involving Chinese state owned enterprises.
According to Risk Intelligence, a Denmark based consultancy, the period following the Ukraine invasion saw China begin constructing dock infrastructure at five major ports along Russia's Arctic coastline, Murmansk, Sabetta, Arkhangelsk, Tiksi, and Uzden, while also developing railway links tied to Chinese logistics networks in the region. Even so, reputational and political constraints complicate Beijing's ability to fully capitalize on these developments. Many European states are expected to deepen defense cooperation with the United States over time, in part because of the high cost burden associated with independent military expansion.
The 2025 National Security Strategy calls for expanded naval and Coast Guard operations and aggressive targeting of drug cartels.
"We want to ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well-governed enough to prevent and discourage mass migration to the United States…"
"We want a Hemisphere whose governments cooperate with us against narco-terrorists, cartels, and other transnational criminal organizations."
Some governments have also used engagement with China as negotiating leverage in their dealings with Washington. Although policymakers recognized limited long term alignment potential with Beijing, engagement was at times used as a form of strategic anesthesia to ease tensions generated by earlier transatlantic political frictions.
The emerging global order reflects a shift in power distribution. The United States remains the predominant power, but no longer operates as a singular hyperpower, with multiple layers of polarity and overlapping blocs now shaping geopolitical alignment. Short of kinetic conflict, Xi Jinping has pursued strategic leverage through the global trade system, advancing industrial policy and a military civil fusion strategy to expand China's influence and operational reach.
